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Abstract 
 
This study provides empirical evidence on the impact of a minimum wage increase on 
employment, wages, and expenditures of workers in the formal sector who have wages 
below the minimum level in Vietnam. Using the difference-in-differences with propensity 
score matching and Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys 2004 and 2006, the 
paper finds that the minimum wage increase reduced employment of low-wage workers 
in the formal sector. However, workers who lost formal sector jobs were able to find jobs 
in the informal sector. The effect of the minimum wage increase on wages and 
expenditures of workers is not statistically significant.  
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1. Introduction  
 
A minimum wage is the lowest hourly, daily or monthly wage that a government requires 
employers to pay to employees. The main objectives of the minimum wage are to 
increase the living standards of laborers, especially the poor and vulnerable, and to 
prevent exploitation of laborers. In addition, the minimum wage has other positive effects 
such as promotion of laborers’ work and productivity, reduction of people covered in 
subsidy programs, increasing consumption, aggregate demand and generation of 
multiplier effects (Freeman, 1994; Dowrick and Quiggin, 2003; Gunderson, 2005).  
 In addition to the positive effects, the minimum wage can have unexpected 
effects. The main negative effect is to increase unemployment, especially among 
unskilled and low-wage workers. In the traditional economic theory, an increase in labor 
cost will reduce demand for labor. It means that the increased minimum wage normally 
leads to unemployment (Hamermesh, 1986). Before 1990s, there was consensus on the 
adverse impacts of the minimum wage on employment. Most of the empirical studies in 
the USA at the time showed that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage resulted in a 
1 to 3 percent reduction in employment (see Brown et al., 1982; Brown, 1999 and Card 
and Krueger, 1995).  
However, in the “new minimum wage research”, there is no consensus on the 
direction of the effect of the minimum wage on employment (Bazen, 2000; Lemos, 2004; 
Neumark and Wascher, 2007). In the economic theory, the minimum wage can have 
negligible effects on employment if the minimum wage is close to the competitive wage, 
or employers have bargaining power so that the elasticity of labor demand is less 
sensitive to the labor cost (Dickens et al., 1995, and 1999). In the monopsony model, the 
increased minimum wage can lead to increase in employment.   
Recent empirical findings on the impact of the minimum wage on employment 
are not consistent. Negative effects of the minimum wage on employment, especially for 
young workers are found in studies on the USA and developed countries (Neumark and 
Wascher, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 2002, 2002 and 2003; Burkhauser et al., 2000; 
Campolieti et al., 2005; Magan and Johnston, 1999; Abowd et al., 1999; Singell and 
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Terborg, 2007). In developing countries, the minimum wage is also found to have 
adverse effects on employment (e.g, Bell, 1997; Gindling and Terrell, 2004; Rama, 2001; 
Harrison and Scorse, 2005). However, other studies found that the minimum wage had 
positive effects on employment such as Turner and Demirlp (2001), Reich and Hall 
(2001), Katz and Krueger (1992), Card (1992), Card and Krueger (1994, 2000), Dickens 
et al. (1999), Montenegro and Pages (2004), Rama (2001).3   
Vietnam is a developing country which has achieved high economic growth, with 
annual GDP growth rates of around 6 percent over the past 10 years. Poverty rates have 
declined remarkably from 58 to 16 percent between 1993 and 2006. To improve the 
living standards of the low-wage workers, the government has increased the nominal 
minimum monthly wage from 120 to more than 650 thousand VND during the period 
1994-2009.  
There are continuing debates about positive and negative impacts of minimum 
wage increases in Vietnam. There are a large number of advocates of the minimum 
wages, who argue that the minimum wage should be increased to compensate low-wage 
workers for the loss in real wages caused by high inflation. Increased wages can lead to 
an increase in aggregate demand and economic growth, especially in the context of 
economic slowdown (e.g., see Dan Tri, 2009a; Thai-Uyen, 2009; Duy-Tuan, 2009). The 
government said that they consulted enterprises about minimum wages, and minimum 
wage increases would have small effects on production, business and employment (Duy-
Tuan, 2009). On the contrary, there are critics that increased wage minimum can result in 
high inflation (e.g. Dan tri 2009b, Bao Moi, 2009). Increased minimum wages can 
increase production costs and unemployment, and add burdens to enterprises, especially 
when there is on-going economic stagnation (Thai-Uyen, 2009).   
The above arguments against or in favor of minimum wage increases are often 
made without empirical evidence on impact evaluation of minimum wage increases. The 
question on the impacts of minimum wage increases on employment as well as income of 
workers in Vietnam remains unanswered so far.   
The main objectives of the paper are to present summary statistics of workers 
below the minimum wage and to measure the impact of the minimum wage increase on 
                                                 
3
 For detailed review of studies on the minimum wage and employment, see Neumark and Wascher (2007). 
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employment, income and consumption expenditure of workers in the formal sector 
including State and private enterprises and organizations. The method of impact 
measurement used in this paper is difference-in-differences with propensity score 
matching, and the data are from Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys in 2004 
and 2006. The paper is expected to make an empirical contribution to the minimum wage 
literature by providing evidence on the effect of the minimum wage increase in Vietnam. 
There are only a few studies on relations between minimum wages and employment in 
Asian developing countries, and Vietnam is a developing and transition country with 
economic conditions very similar to many countries in Asia.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces data 
sources used in this study. Section 3 presents data on the minimum wages in Vietnam. 
Section 4 describes the methodology. Section 5 presents the impact estimates of the 
minimum wage increase. Finally, section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Data Set 
 
The study relies on data from two recent Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys 
(VHLSS), which were conducted by the General Statistical Office of Vietnam (GSO) 
with technical support from the World Bank (WB) in the years 2004 and 2006. The 2004 
and 2006 VHLSSs cover 9188 and 9189 households, respectively. The samples are 
representative for the national, rural and urban, and regional levels. The 2004 and 2006 
VHLSSs have a panel of 4216 households, for which data is available for both years.  
 For the both surveys, the time of data collection took place mainly in June and 
September. Around 45 and 35 percent of sampled households were surveyed in June and 
September, respectively. The remaining 20 percent of the sample were surveyed in other 
months, mainly in July and October.  
The surveys collected information by means of household and community level 
questionnaires. Information on households includes basic demography, employment and 
labor force participation, education, health, wage, income, expenditure, housing, fixed 
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assets and durable goods, and participation of households in poverty alleviation 
programs.  
Expenditure and income per capita are collected using detailed questions. 
Expenditure includes food and non-food expenditure. Food expenditure includes 
purchased food and foodstuff and self-produced products of households. Non-food 
expenditure comprises expenditure on education, healthcare expenditure, expenditure on 
houses and commodities, and expenditure on power, water supply and garbage. 
Regarding income, household income can come from any source. Income includes 
income from agricultural and non-agricultural production, salary, wage, pensions, 
scholarship, income from loan interest and house rental, remittances and social transfers. 
Income from agricultural production comprises crop income, livestock income, 
aquaculture income, and income from other agriculture-related activities.   
3. Minimum Wages and Wage Earners in Vietnam 
 
3.1. Minimum Wage Adjustments 
 
In Vietnam, the minimum wage is the lowest monthly wage for a simple worker in 
normal working conditions (Vu-Thieu, 2006). Vietnam has only minimum monthly wage. 
There is neither minimum daily nor hourly wage. The government adjusts the minimum 
wages when there is price inflation and economic growth. According to the Labor Law of 
Vietnam, the minimum wage is adjusted as the prices of commodities and services 
change. When the economy experiences high economic growth, the minimum wage is 
also increased to improve the living standard of workers. In addition, payment capacity of 
the State budget is considers when the minimum wage is adjusted, since wages of 
workers in the State sector are tied to the level of the minimum wage.  
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Figure 1. Minimum monthly wage in Vietnam (thousand VND) 
 
Source: Government of Vietnam. 2006, 2008, and 2009 
There have been 9 increases in the minimum monthly wage in Vietnam since 
1993. The timing and the minimum wages are presented in Figure 1. It shows that the 
nominal minimum wage increased by 442 percent from 120 to 650 thousand VND during 
the period 1994-2009. However, the real minimum wage (in terms of the price of 1999) 
increased by 118 percent.   
It should be noted that the minimum wages presented in Figure 1 are applied for 
the governmental sector and the domestic sector. Minimum wages applied for the foreign 
sector including foreign joint-venture enterprises, foreign-invested enterprises, 
international individuals, institutions and organizations are higher.  
Since the available data are from VHLSSs 2004 and 2006, this paper will examine 
the impacts of minimum wage increase from 290 to 350 thousand VND in October 2005 
on the income and employment of workers in the domestic sectors including public and 
private sectors. During the 2004-2006 period, there was no change in the minimum wages 
for the foreign and international sectors. 
 
3.2. Minimum Wages and Workers’ Wages 
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In this paper, wage earners are divided into formal and informal employment sectors. 
People who work for other households are called workers in the informal sector. These 
people often do not have labor contracts and are not enrolled in social insurance. People 
working for State and private enterprises/organizations are called workers in the formal 
sector.  
Figure 2. Distribution of nominal monthly wage of workers by occupation sector 
Year 2004 Year 2006 
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Source: Estimation VHLSSs in 2004 and 2006. 
Although the minimum wage is applied for all laborers, there is no guarantee that 
all workers will be paid above the minimum wage, especially for workers in the informal 
sector. Figure 2 presents distribution of nominal monthly wage of workers from 15 to 60 
years old in different sectors. This monthly wage is from the main employment of 
workers during the past 12 months. We do not consider wages from secondary 
employment, since most secondary employments are short-time and informal. It shows 
that there were a proportion of workers who received wages below the minimum wages.  
Table 1 presents more detailed estimates on distribution and monthly wage of 
workers from 15 to 60 years old by employment sectors. It shows that the distribution of 
workers by employment sectors was almost unchanged during 2004-2006. In 2006, there 
were around 20 percent of people who were not involved in productive activities. They 
can be students, retired or unemployed workers. People who worked for their own 
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households accounted for 52.2 percent of the labor force. The percentage of people 
working for other households was 12.7 percent of the labor force. This group has the 
lowest average wages. The percentage of workers below the minimum wage in this group 
was 6.5 and 6.8 percent in 2004 and 2006, respectively. 
The proportion of people working for State and private enterprises/organizations 
was 8.4 and 6.7 percent in 2006, respectively. Regarding wages, the State sector had the 
highest average wages, followed by the private formal sector. However, the private 
formal sector had a smaller fraction of workers below the minimum wage. The 
percentage of workers below the minimum wage in the formal private sector was 3.7 and 
3 percent in 2004 and 2006, respectively. Meanwhile, there corresponding numbers for 
the State sector are 5.1 and 4.2 percent. The fact that there are a relatively large 
proportion of workers in the formal sectors having wages below the minimum level 
suggests that many employers do not comply with minimum wage regulations as well as 
the labor law.  
Table 1. Distribution and nominal monthly wage of people involved in productive 
activities 
People from 15 to 60 
years old 
2004 2006 
Percent Monthly 
wage  
(‘000 
VND) 
% with 
wage 
lower 
than 
290,000 
VND 
% with 
wage 
lower 
than 
350,000 
VND 
Percent Monthly 
wage  
(‘000 
VND) 
% with 
wage 
lower 
than 
290,000 
VND 
% with 
wage 
lower 
than 
350,000 
VND 
Not working 18.6 - - - 20.0 - - - 
Working for their 
households 54.3 - - - 52.2 - - - 
Working for other 
households (informal 
sector) 
12.8 671.9 6.5 11.4 12.7 738.7 6.8 15.2 
Working for State 
sector (formal sector) 8.5 1091.3 5.1 7.6 8.4 1252.8 4.2 7.9 
Working for private 
sector (formal sector) 5.9 918.9 3.7 7.6 6.7 985.0 3.0 6.7 
Total 100 856.8 5.5 9.4 100 953.9 5.1 10.9 
Number of obs. 25655    25708    
Source: Estimation from VHLSSs 2004 and 2006. 
 
 Table 1 also presents the percentage of workers below the minimum wage of the 
next period. In 2004, the proportion of workers below the level to which the minimum 
wage rose in the next year in the formal sector was 7.6 percent. This group can be mostly 
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affected by the minimum increase. This paper will measure impacts of the minimum 
wage increase on workers in the formal sector. For the informal sector, the corresponding 
number is 11.4. The paper does not evaluate the impact on this group, since the informal 
sector rarely follows the minimum wage regulations.4  
 Table 2 examines how the monthly wage and employment of workers below the 
minimum wage of the next period changes over time. Among workers employed in 2004, 
the proportion of people involved in productive activities in 2006 was 95.5 percent. This 
fraction for workers who had the 2004 monthly wages below 350 thousand VND in the 
informal and formal sectors was 90.6 and 97 percent, respectively. It is not clear that 
workers below the minimum wage in the formal sector were unemployed after the 
minimum wage increase. However, workers with wages below 350 thousand VND in 
2004 tended to move out of the formal sector in 2006. Among workers in the formal 
sector in 2004, the fraction of those remaining in the formal sector in 2006 was 58.4 and 
78.5 percent for workers with wages below and above the 350 thousand VND, 
respectively. This might be explained by two reasons. Firstly, it can be evidence that the 
minimum wage increase leads to unemployment in the formal sector. Secondly, low 
wages in the formal sector push workers to look for higher income jobs in the informal 
sector. As a result, if they find good jobs in the informal sector, they will move there.  
 Table 2 shows that workers with low wages in 2004 had a very high fraction of 
having wages lower than the minimum wage in 2006. Among the workers who had the 
2004 wages below 350 thousand VND, the fraction of workers having the 2006 wages 
below 350 thousand VND was 15.3 and 27.3 percent for the informal and formal sectors, 
respectively. However, workers with low wages in 2004 experienced higher average 
growth rates of wages and consumption expenditures than workers with high wages over 
the period 2004-2006. 
                                                 
4
 Not only the minimum wage but also other regulations such as health insurance, social insurance, labor 
contracts are not often implemented in the informal sector.  
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Table 2. Employment, monthly wages and expenditure of workers with wages above and under 350 thousand VND 
 
Workers from 15 
to 60 years old 
Wages in 
2004 
(thousand 
VND) 
No. of 
Obs. 
Percent % people 
working 
in 2006 
% people 
working 
in the 
formal 
sector in 
2006 
% workers 
with 
nominal 
wage 
below 
350,000 
VND in 
2006 
Monthly 
wage in 
2004 
(‘000 
VND) 
Monthly 
wage in 
2006 – in 
2004 
price 
(‘000 
VND) 
% 
increase 
in 
monthly 
wage 
Monthly 
expend. 
in 2004 
(‘000 
VND) 
Monthly 
expend. 
in 2006 – 
in 2004 
price 
(‘000 
VND) 
% 
increase 
in 
monthly 
expend. 
Working for other 
households in 2004 
(informal sector) 
Wage < 350 169 6.4 90.6 10.7 15.3 261.9 546.6 108.7 252.9 314.9 24.5 
Wage ≥ 350 1069 41.3 95.6 9.1 4.4 741.7 759.1 2.3 300.9 343.6 14.2 
Working for 
formal sectors in 
2004 
Wage < 350 112 4.3 97.0 58.4 27.3 246.8 532.8 115.9 383.6 426.0 11.1 
Wage ≥ 350 1206 48.0 95.9 78.5 1.1 1084.6 1289.3 18.9 621.0 679.8 9.5 
Total  2556 100 95.5 44.7 4.0 885.5 1029.0 16.2 476.6 529.0 11.0 
Note: Monthly wages and expenditure are in thousand VND and in the 2004 price.  
Source: Estimation from VHLSSs 2004 and 2006. 
 
Table 3. Month wages and expenditure of people involved in productive activities in formal and informal sectors 
Working people from 15 to 60 years 
old 
No. of 
Obs. 
Percent % workers 
with wage 
lower than 
350,000 
VND in 2006 
Monthly 
wage in 
2004 
(‘000 VND) 
Monthly 
wage in 
2006  
(‘000 VND) 
% 
increase 
in 
monthly 
wage 
Monthly 
expend. in 
2004 
(‘000 
VND) 
Monthly 
expend. in 
2006  
(‘000 VND) 
% increase 
in monthly 
expend. 
Working in informal sector in both 
2004 and 2006 723 35.6 5.7 670.6 722.6 7.8 281.8 327.2 16.1 
Working in informal sector in 2004 
but formal sector in 2006 110 5.8 5.8 772.9 803.8 4.0 376.9 419.5 11.3 
Working in formal sector in 2004 
but informal sector in 2006 113 6.2 3.8 823.4 1037.9 26.1 419.0 467.2 11.5 
Working in formal sector in both 
2004 and 2006 1015 52.4 2.8 1051.2 1260.9 19.9 626.6 685.4 9.4 
Total 1961 100 4.0 885.5 1029.0 16.2 476.6 529.0 11.0 
Note: Monthly wages and expenditure are in thousand VND and in the current price.  
Source: Estimation from panel data of VHLSSs 2004 and 2006. 
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Table 3 examines changes in wages and expenditure of workers in different 
employment sectors during the period 2004-2006. The real monthly wage of workers in 
the formal sector in both 2004 and 2006 increased by around 19.9 percent during 2004-
2006. Workers who moved from the informal sector to the formal one experienced only 
an increase of 4 percent in monthly wages. On the contrary, workers who moved from the 
formal sector to the informal one increased their wages substantially by around 26.1 
percent. Workers in the formal sector in both 2004 and 2006 also had a high growth rate 
of monthly wages, at 7.8 percent. Regarding consumption expenditure, workers with low 
wages had higher growth rates of consumption expenditure than workers with high wages 
during 2004-2006.  
 
4. Methodology of Impact Evaluation 
 
4.1. Parameter of Interest 
 
The main objective of impact evaluation of a program is to assess the extent to what the 
program has changed outcomes of subjects. In this study, we aim to measure the effect of 
minimum wages on outcomes of workers in the formal sector. Denote D as a binary 
variable indicating exposure of a person to a minimum wage increase, i.e. D equals 1 if 
she can be affected by the minimum wage increase, and D equals 0 otherwise. In this 
paper, D equals 1 for workers who had employment in the formal sector and monthly 
wages below 350 thousand VND in 2004. These people are expected to be affected by the 
increase of minimum wage from 290 to 350 thousand VND in 2005. Further let Y denote 
the observed value of an interested outcome. This variable can have two potential values 
depending on the value of D, i.e. 1YY =  for 1=D , and 0YY =  for 0=D .5 For consistency 
with the literatture of impact evaluation, in this paper, workers who are affected by or 
exposed to the minimum wage increase are sometimes called participants or treated, and 
workers who are not affected by the minimum wage increase are sometimes called non-
                                                 
5
 Y can be a vector of outcomes, but for simplicity let’s consider a single outcome of interest.  
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participants or untreated. In addition, the minimum wage increase is sometimes called the 
program. 
The most popular parameter of the program impact is Average Treatment Effect 
on the Treated (ATT) (Heckman et al., 1999), which is the expected impact of the 
program on the actual participants:6 
                              )1()1()1( 0101 =−===−= DYEDYEDYYEATT   (1) 
This parameter can be varied across a vector of the observed variables X:  
                       ( ) )1,|()1,|()1,|( 01 =−===∆= DXYEDXYEDXEATT X    (2) 
Estimation of ATT is not straightforward, since )1|( 0 =DYE  is not observed and cannot 
be estimated directly. )1|( 0 =DYE  is called counterfactual which would have been the 
expected outcome of participants if they had not been affected by the minimum wage.  
 
4.2. Difference-in-Differences with Matching Method 
 
When panel data on the treatment and control groups before and after the treatment are 
available, the difference-in-differences estimator can be used to estimate the impact of the 
treatment program. The difference-in-differences estimator can be combined with 
matching to control differences in observed variables between the treatment and control 
groups. The basic idea of the matching method is to find a comparison group that has the 
same (or at least similar) distribution of the variables X as that of the treatment group7. 
Compared with difference-in-differences regression, the matching method has the main 
advantage that it does not require an assumption on the functional form of outcome. Thus 
it can avoid bias caused by misspecification of outcome functions.  
                                                 
6
 There are other parameters such as average treatment effect (ATE), local average treatment effect, 
marginal treatment effect, or even effect of “non-treatment on non-treated” which measures what impact 
the program would have on the non-participants if they had participated in the program, etc.  
7
 There is a large amount of literature on matching methods of impact evaluation e.g. see Rubin (1977), 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983),  Heckman et al. (1997), Dehejia and Wahba (1998), and Smith and Todd 
(2005).  
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To describe the method, let 20040Y  denote the outcome in 2004, i.e., before the 
2005 minimum wage increase. After the minimum wage increase, the potential outcomes 
in 2006 are denoted by 20061
2006
0 ,YY corresponding to the states of no minimum wage 
increase and minimum wage increase. The ATT(X) after the minimum wage increase is 
defined as: 
                                  )|X, D) - E(Y|X, D  E(YATT(X) 11 2006020061 ===   (3) 
The difference-in-differences with matching relies on an assumption that conditional on 
X, the difference in the expectation of outcomes between the participants and non-
participants is unchanged before and after the minimum wage increase, i.e.:   
  )0,|()1,|()0,|()1,|( 20060200602004020040 =−===−= DXYEDXYEDXYEDXYE .    (4) 
Under this assumption, the conditional parameter ATT(X) can be identified by the 
matching method, since: 
       
[ ]
[ ]
[ ] [ ])|X,DE(Y)|X,DE(Y-)|X,D)-E(Y|X, DE(Y                   
)|X,DE(Y)|X,DE(Y                       
)|X,DE(Y)|X,DE(Y)- |X, D) - E(Y|X, D  E(YATT(X)
0101
11
0011
2004
0
2004
0
2006
0
2006
1
2004
0
2006
0
2004
0
2006
0
2006
0
2006
1
=−====
=−=+
=−====
  (5) 
The unconditional parameter is also identified, since: 
                                                ∫
=
==
1
1
X|D (X) )dF(X|DATTATT .   (6) 
To estimate the program impact, the non-participants are matched with the 
participants based on their variables X before and after the program. The matched non-
participants will form a control group. To find a control group who has similar variables 
X, we require a so-called common support assumption: 
                                                             1)|1(0 <=< XDP ,     (7) 
which states that there are non-participants who have the X variables similar to those of 
the participants.     
A problem in the matching is how to match non-participants with participants. 
There will be no problem if there is a single conditioning variable X. However, X are 
often a vector of variables, and finding “close” non-participants to match with 
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participants is not straightforward. Since a paper by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), a 
widely-used way to find the matched sample is the propensity score matching.8 Non-
participants and participants are matched based on the closeness of the propensity score, 
which is equal to the probability of being assigned into the program. In this paper, the 
matching based on the propensity score is employed.  
In addition, depending on the number of non-participants are matched with a 
participant, we can have different matching estimators. In this paper, we use nearest-
neighbors and kernel matching to examine the sensitivity the impact estimates. The 
matching estimator is based on equation (5). It is equal to the difference in differences in 
outcomes between the treatment group and the control group before and after the 
minimum wage increase. The formulas of the estimators are presented in Appendix 2. 
The standard errors are calculated using bootstrap techniques.9   
 
5. Impact Estimation 
 
5.1. Definition of Treatment and Control Groups 
 
In this paper, we estimate the impact of the minimum wage increase in 2005 on 
employment, monthly wage and consumption expenditure on workers who worked in the 
formal sectors (State and private) and had monthly wages below 350 thousand VND in 
2004.10 These workers are expected to be exposed to the effect of the minimum wage 
                                                 
8
 Other matching methods can be subclassification (see, e.g., Cochran and Chambers, 1965; Cochran, 1968) 
and covariate matching (Rubin, 1979, 1980). 
9
 This bootstrap is implemented by repeatedly drawing samples from the original sample of the VHLSS 
panel data. Since the VHLSSs sample selection follows stratified random cluster sampling, communes (i.e., 
primary sampling units) instead of households are bootstrapped in each stratum (Deaton, 1997). In other 
words, the bootstrap is made of communes (i.e., clusters) within strata. The number of replications is 500. 
We also tried to bootstrap households instead of communes, and the results of both possibilities are very 
similar.  
Abadie and Imbens (2006) show that bootstrap can give invalid standard errors for the nearest neighbor 
matching estimator. However, there has not been evidence on the validity of standard errors for other 
matching estimators using bootstrap. Most empirical studies rely on the bootstrap to estimate standard 
errors of matching estimators.      
10
 As mentioned in the previous section, we do not evaluate the impact on workers in the informal sector, 
since the informal sector rarely follows the labor regulations such as contract, insurance and minimum 
wages. 
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increase. The treatment group does not include workers in the foreign sector, since there 
was no adjustment of minimum wages for this sector during the 2004-2006 period.  
There are two control groups. The first control group is workers who were in the 
formal sector and had monthly wages from 350 to 650 thousand VND in 2004. The 
matching is performed between workers with monthly wages below and above 350 
thousand VND. This way is similar to method based on discontinuity design (see, 
e.g.,Van der Klaauw, 2002; Hahn, et al., 2001). Ideally, we should have the control group 
and treatment group just around 350 thousand VND. However, there are few observations 
around the 350 thousand VND level in the data set, and we have to use all the 
observations below 350 thousand VND as the treatment group and all the observations 
from 350 to 650 thousand VND as the control group. The number of observations in the 
treatment and control groups is 112 and 351, respectively.11 It should be noted that the 
number of observations in the treatment groups is relatively small, and as a result the 
estimation results should be interpreted with caution on the representativeness of the 
sampled observations. 
 Estimating the effect of minimum wages on wages is challenging due to lack of a 
clean control group. Using the control group from the formal sector can underestimate 
effects of the minimum wage increase on monthly wages, since workers above 350 
thousand VND in the formal sector, especially in the State sector can be also affected by 
the minimum wage increase. In some State enterprises and organizations, wage of a 
worker can be set up equal to a wage coefficient multiplied by the minimum wage. For 
example, a worker who has a wage coefficient of 5 will receive wage equal to the 
minimum wage multiplied by 5. If the minimum wage increases from 290 to 350 
thousand VND, her wage will automatically increase from 1450 to 1750 thousand VND 
(even that her wage before the minimum wage increase is much higher than the new 
minimum wage).  
The second control group is constructed from the wage earners in the informal 
sector in both 2004 and 2006. The number of observations in this control group is 99. The 
                                                 
11
 We examined the sensitivity of the impact estimates to the definition of the control group by changing 
the wage level to define the control group from 650 thousand VND to 600 and to 500 thousand VND. The 
results are quite similar. We do not present results of impact estimations using these other treatment groups 
in this paper. However, the results can be provided on request.   
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treatment group in this case includes workers in formal sectors in both 2004 and 2006. As 
a result, the number of observations in the treatment group is only 64. This control group 
is expected to be affected negligibly by the minimum wage increase. In addition, the 
control group includes those who had monthly wages below 350 thousand VND in 2004 
so that they can have similar wages at the baseline as the control group. However, 
estimation results using this control group should be interpreted with great caution. 
Workers in the informal sector often do not have written labor contracts, and the 
minimum wage is not formally applied in the informal section. However, it is possible 
that when the minimum wage increases, workers in the informal sector will ask an 
increase in their wages. As a result, the control group can be also affected by the 
minimum wage increase.  
We do not include self-employed workers in any control group, since the 
definition of employment can be different between self-employed workers and employed 
workers and there is no data on wages for self-employed workers. All individuals in the 
treatment and control groups are from 15 to 60 years old in 2004. In this paper, we do not 
estimate impacts separately for the State or private sectors, since the number in each 
sector is very small. 
The 2004 data are regarded as the baseline data of the 2005 minimum wage 
increases, while the 2004 data are regarded as the post-treatment data of the minimum 
wage increase. It should be noted that the minimum wages were also increased in October 
2006 (section 3.1). However, as mentioned in section 2, the 2006 VHLSS was mainly 
conducted in June and September 2006. Thus the 2006 VHLSS was not affected by the 
minimum wage increase in October 2006.  
It should be noted that the treatment group and the first control group differ in the 
2004 wages, while the treatment group and the second control group differ in terms of 
employment sector (formal versus informal sector). Thus the treatment group and the two 
control groups can differ in both observed and unobserved characteristics. Matching can 
eliminate the difference in observed characteristics, and difference-in-differences 
estimation can eliminate the difference in time-invariant unobserved characteristics 
between the treatment and control groups. The main assumption for the difference-in-
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differences with matching method is that there is no difference in the expectation of time-
variant unobserved variables between the treatment and control groups.  
The estimates will be biased if the above assumption does not hold. For example, 
suppose that non-cognitive skills have a positive effect on employment, and low-wage 
workers in the treatment groups have lower non-cognitive skills than high-wage workers 
in the first control group. If the gap in non-cognitive skills between the treatment and 
control groups tends to increase overtime, then our difference-in-differences will 
overestimate the effect of the minimum wage increase. It means that without the 
minimum wage increase, low-wage workers are still more likely to lose job than high-
wage workers. Similarly, the treatment group and the second control group can differ in 
time-variant unobserved variables, which can cause our estimates biased. However, it is 
expected that most important unobserved variables such working motivation and non-
cognitive skills are time-invariants during a not so long time period 2004-2006.      
 
5.2. Propensity Score Estimation 
 
The first step in measuring the impact of the minimum wage increase is to predict the 
propensity score, i.e., the probability of having monthly wage below 350 thousand VND. 
Since the dependent variable is binary, a logit regression is used. The main problem in the 
estimation is how to select explanatory variables. The explanatory variables include age, 
sex, married, ethnicity, education and occupation, households’ land, regional and urban 
variables. To ensure the explanatory variables be exogenous to the minimum wage 
increase, all of them are before the minimum wage increase, i.e., in the 2004 VHLSS. 
The variables are described in Table A.1 of Appendix 1. In order to control for inflation, 
we have deflated all outcome variables in terms of 2004 prices. 
 Table A.2 presents the logit regressions. The full models use all the available 
explanatory variables, while the partial models keep only variables which are statistically 
significant at 10% (using stepwise regressions).12 The partial models are used for 
prediction of propensity scores. Two samples are used: (i) the first with both treatment 
                                                 
12
 Both backward and forward stepwise regressions results in the same models. 
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and control groups from the formal sector; (ii) the second with the treatment group from 
the formal sector and the control group from the informal sector.   
Explanatory variables in the logit regressions have expected signs. For the first 
sample, age has a negative sign, while age squared has a positive sign (Table A.2). It 
means that the probability of having wages below the minimum wages tend to increase 
when workers are young, and then decrease when workers become older. Female are 
more likely to have wages below the minimum wages than male. Ethnic minority workers 
are more likely to have wages below the minimum wages than Kinh (Vietnamese) 
workers. The second sample in Table A.2 shows that workers who are married and have 
higher education are more likely to work in the formal sector. On the contrary, workers 
who are unskilled and agricultural are more likely to work in the informal sector. 
To examine the common support, Figure A.1 of the propensity score is produced. 
There are many untreated workers having similar propensity scores as the treated 
workers. It should be noted that the use of the predicted propensity score is mainly aimed 
to overcome the multidimensionality problem of matching by the explanatory variables 
(covariates). The quality of a constructed comparison group should be assessed by testing 
whether the distribution of characteristics covariates is similar between the comparison 
and treatment groups given the predicted propensity score. Thus, we test the equality of 
the mean of covariates between the treatment and comparison using t-test, and we cannot 
reject the equality of the mean of X between the treatment and matched groups.13 
 
5.3. Impact Estimation 
 
Table 4 presents impacts of the minimum wage increase in 2005 on employment of the 
workers in the formal sector and with wage below the 350 thousand VND in 2004 using 
three matching estimators including 5 nearest neighbors and kernel matching with 
                                                 
13
 The results of balancing test for these estimators are not presented in this paper. However, the test results 
are provided for reviewers and can also be provided for readers on request. We relied on the Stata 
command called “psmatch2” to perform the matching estimators. However, we do not use the original 
command for the estimation, since the command does not allow sampling weights. We revised the 
command to allow for sampling weights. We also estimated the impacts without sampling weights. The 
results are very similar to those using the sampling weights.   
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bandwidth of 0.01 and 0.05. It shows that the impact of the minimum wage increase on 
overall employment is very small and not statistically significant. However, the minimum 
wage increase has negative and statistically significant effects on employment in the 
formal sectors. Workers with low wages tend to lose jobs in the formal sector and find 
jobs in the informal sector.  
   For additional robust analysis, we run parametric difference-in-differences 
regressions (Table A.3). Similarly to the matching method, the minimum wage increase is 
found to have a negative effect on employment in the formal sector but not a significant 
effect on overall employment. 
However, the finding on employment effects should be interpreted with caution. 
The impact of the minimum wage increase can be overestimated if workers with too low 
wages want to quit work in the formal sector to work for their households or other 
households. The difficulty in interpretation results from the difference in wages between 
the treatment group and the control group (the treatment group has wages below the level 
of 350 thousand VND, whereas the control group has wages from this level and above).  
 To examine this issue, we compute the growth rate of monthly wages during 
2004-2006 for workers who had the 2004 wages below 350 thousand VND and remained 
in the formal sector for both 2004 and 2006, and for workers who had the 2004 wages 
below 350 thousand VND and switched from in the formal sector in 2006 to the informal 
sector in 2004. If workers moving from formal to informal sectors to seek higher income 
jobs, we would expect that they would have higher growth rate of wages than those 
sticking to the formal sector. The corresponding growth rates are around 120 and 112 
percent, respectively. Workers who switched from in the formal sector to the informal 
sector experienced a higher growth rate than workers who remained in the formal sector. 
However, this difference is not statistically significant.   
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Table 4. The impact on employment: control group from the formal sector 
Outcomes and 
matching schemes 
 2004   2006  
Diff-in-diff Treated Matched 
Control 
Diff Treated Matched 
Control 
Diff 
 (1) (2) (3)=(1)–(2) (4) (5) (6)=(4)–(5) (7)=(6)-(5) 
Have job (%)        
Five nearest 
neighbors matching 
100.0 100.0 0.0 97.0*** 95.8*** 1.2 1.2 
[0.0] [0.0] [0.0] [1.5] [2.2] [2.5] [2.5] 
Kernel matching: 
bandwidth = 0.01 
100.0 100.0 0.0 97.0*** 95.9*** 1.1 1.1 
[0.0] [0.0] [0.0] [1.5] [1.8] [2.3] [2.3] 
Kernel matching: 
bandwidth = 0.05 
100.0 100.0 0.0 97.0*** 95.5*** 1.5 1.5 
[0.0] [0.0] [0.0] [1.5] [1.4] [2.0] [2.0] 
Have formal sector 
jobs (%)        
Five nearest 
neighbors matching 
100.0 100.0 0.0 58.3*** 69.4*** -11.2* -11.2* 
[0.0] [0.0] [0.0] [4.6] [4.9] [6.8] [6.8] 
Kernel matching: 
bandwidth = 0.01 
100.0 100.0 0.0 58.3*** 69.2*** -10.9* -10.9* 
[0.0] [0.0] [0.0] [4.6] [4.3] [6.3] [6.3] 
Kernel matching: 
bandwidth = 0.05 
100.0 100.0 0.0 58.3*** 70.0*** -11.8** -11.8** 
[0.0] [0.0] [0.0] [4.6] [3.2] [5.7] [5.7] 
Note: The treated are workers who worked in the formal sector and had monthly wages below 350,000 VND 
in 2004. The matched control is also workers in the formal sector in 2004 and had monthly wages from 
350,000 to 650,000 VND in 2004. The treated and matched groups have been matched based on the closeness 
of propensity scores.  
Columns (1) and (2) report the mean outcomes of the treatment group and the matched control group in 2004, 
respectively. Column (3) is the difference in the mean outcome between the treatment and control groups in 
2004. Similarly, columns (4) and (5) present the mean outcomes of the treatment group and the matched 
control group in 2006, respectively. Column (6) is the difference between columns (4) and (5). Column (7) is 
the difference between columns (3) and (6). The difference-in-differences estimator is presented by equation 
(A.3) in Appendix 2.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in bracket (Standard errors are calculated using bootstrap with 500 replications. Standard 
errors are also corrected for sampling weights and cluster correlation). 
Source: Estimation from panel data of VHLSSs 2004 and 2006. 
  
In addition, we examine the transition from the formal to informal sector by 
running a difference-in-differences regression of probability of having a formal job on 
wages in 2004  using a sample, which including laborers in the formal sector in 2004 with 
monthly wage between 350,000 VND and 1,000,000 VND in 2004. Employment of these 
workers was expected not affected by the minimum wage increase. If low-wage workers 
are more likely to move to the informal sector, the effect of wages in 2004 should be 
negative. However, we found a positive and not significant effect of the 2004 wages on 
the probability of remaining employed in the formal sector. Thus there is not strong 
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evidence that low-wage workers were moving from the formal to informal sector for 
higher income.      
Table 5 presents the impact estimates on monthly wages. For the both control 
groups, the effect of minimum wages on monthly wages is not statistically significant. 
Construction of a clean control group for measurement of the effect on wages is 
challenging. As presented, wages on some workers in the control group which include 
workers in the formal sector having wages above 350 thousand VND can also be affected 
by the minimum wage increases. The control group which includes worker in the 
informal sector might not be valid, since they can be different from the control group in 
terms on time-variant unobserved variables.  
Table 5. The impact on monthly wages 
Outcomes and 
matching schemes 
 2004   2006  
Diff-in-diff Treated Matched 
Control 
Diff Treated Matched 
Control 
Diff 
 (1) (2) (3)=(1)–(2) (4) (5) (6)=(4)–(5) (7)=(6)-(5) 
Control group from 
the formal sector        
Five nearest 
neighbors matching 
246.5*** 498.0*** -251.5*** 531.7*** 749.5*** -217.8*** 33.7 
[8.8] [9.2] [12.4] [32.9] [55.3] [65.8] [63.9] 
Kernel matching: 
bandwidth = 0.01 
246.5*** 499.3*** -252.8*** 531.7*** 754.9*** -223.2*** 29.6 
[8.8] [7.6] [11.6] [32.9] [60.2] [68.7] [67.4] 
Kernel matching: 
bandwidth = 0.05 
246.5*** 497.2*** -250.7*** 531.7*** 758.0*** -226.3*** 24.4 
8.8 6.1 [10.2] [32.9] [42.1] [54.0] [52.1] 
Control group from 
the informal sector        
Five nearest 
neighbors matching 
248.6*** 241.4*** 7.2 508.6*** 580.2*** -71.6 -78.8 
[9.7] [16.4] [19.0] [37.1] [131.2] [133.4] [142.4] 
Kernel matching: 
bandwidth = 0.01 
248.6*** 251.0*** -2.4 508.6*** 589.6*** -81.0 -78.6 
[9.7] [13.9] [16.6] [37.1] [99.1] [103.7] [109.0] 
Kernel matching: 
bandwidth = 0.05 
248.6*** 238.4*** 10.2 508.6*** 585.9*** -77.3 -87.6 
[9.7] [15.8] [18.1] [37.1] [120.9] [123.7] [132.7] 
Note: For the upper panel of the table, the treated are workers who worked in the formal sector and had 
monthly wages below 350,000 VND in 2004. The matched control is also workers in the formal sector in 2004 
and had monthly wages from 350,000 to 650,000 VND in 2004.  
The lower panel of the table uses the sample of workers in workers in both the formal and informal sectors 
who have monthly wages in 2004 below 350,000 VND. The treatment group includes informal workers, while 
the control group includes informal workers. 
The columns in this table have the same interpretation as columns in Table 4. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in bracket (Standard errors are calculated using bootstrap with 500 replications. Standard 
errors are also corrected for sampling weights and cluster correlation). 
Source: Estimation from panel data of VHLSSs 2004 and 2006. 
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Finally, Table 6 presents the impact estimates on per capita monthly expenditure. 
It shows that impacts on expenditure are quite small and not statistically significant. 
Consumption expenditure per worker is calculated by dividing household expenditure by 
household size. Thus it is difficult for the change in wages of some members to have 
significant impacts on a household’s consumption, especially when the proportion of 
people having jobs in the formal sector is rather small in Vietnam.  
Table 6. The impact on monthly per capita expenditure 
Outcomes and 
matching schemes 
 2004   2006  
Diff-in-diff Treated Matched 
Control 
Diff Treated Matched 
Control 
Diff 
 (1) (2) (3)=(1)–(2) (4) (5) (6)=(4)–(5) (7)=(6)-(5) 
Control group from 
the formal sector        
Five nearest 
neighbors matching 
383.6*** 409.9*** -26.3 426.0*** 459.8*** -33.8 -7.5 
[30.6] [27.7] [38.2] [27.2] [32.6] [39.0] [35.3] 
Kernel matching: 
bandwidth = 0.01 
383.6*** 420.7*** -37.1 426.0*** 471.5*** -45.5 -8.4 
[30.6] [21.8] [35.6] [27.2] [27.4] [36.9] [33.1] 
Kernel matching: 
bandwidth = 0.05 
383.6*** 391.1*** -7.5 426.0*** 467.0*** -41.0 -33.5 
[30.6] [16.2] [33.1] [27.2] [21.5] [32.6] [29.8] 
Control group from 
the informal sector        
Five nearest 
neighbors matching 
395.9*** 303.4*** 92.5* 441.6*** 397.2*** 44.5 -48.0 
[36.9] [39.7] [49.4] [33.3] [58.2] [62.6] [47.8] 
Kernel matching: 
bandwidth = 0.01 
395.9*** 295.0*** 100.9*** 441.6*** 379.9*** 61.8 -39.1 
[36.9] [36.1] [47.4] [33.3] [50.5] [55.9] [46.4] 
Kernel matching: 
bandwidth = 0.05 
395.9*** 302.3*** 93.6* 441.6*** 395.0*** 46.7 -47.0 
[36.9] [38.9] [49.6] [33.3] [62.3] [65.7] [52.3] 
Note: For the upper panel of the table, the treated are workers who worked in the formal sector and had 
monthly wages below 350,000 VND in 2004. The matched control is also workers in the formal sector in 2004 
and had monthly wages from 350,000 to 650,000 VND in 2004.  
The lower panel of the table uses the sample of workers in workers in both the formal and informal sectors 
who have monthly wages in 2004 below 350,000 VND. The treatment group includes informal workers, while 
the control group includes informal workers. 
The columns in this table have the same interpretation as columns in Table 4. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in bracket (Standard errors are calculated using bootstrap with 500 replications. Standard 
errors are also corrected for sampling weights and cluster correlation). 
Source: Estimation from panel data of VHLSSs 2004 and 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 23
6. Conclusions  
 
Since the year 1993, there have been 9 adjustments of the minimum monthly wage in 
Vietnam. All of these adjustments are increases in the minimum wage. The main reason 
for the minimum wage increase is to compensate for high inflation and to increase 
welfare of the low-wage workers. However, this positive effect can be mitigated if the 
minimum wage increases can result in unemployment. This paper is the first attempt to 
measure the impact of the minimum wage increase on employment, wages and 
expenditures of workers who are below the minimum wage and working in the formal 
sector, i.e. State and private enterprises/organizations in Vietnam. 
 Using data from VHLSSs 2004 and 2006, the paper found that there were a large 
proportion of workers receiving wage below the minimum wage. The proportion of 
workers below the minimum wage in the formal private sector was 3.7 and 3 percent in 
2004 and 2006, respectively. Meanwhile, there corresponding numbers for the State 
sectors are 5.1 and 4.2 percent. In the informal sector (i.e., households are employers), the 
proportion of workers below the minimum wage in this group was 6.5 and 6.8 percent in 
2004 and 2006, respectively.   
 Next, the paper measures impacts of the minimum wage increase in 2005 on 
employment, monthly wages and consumption expenditure of the workers in the formal 
sector and having wages below 350 thousand VND in 2004 using the difference-in-
differences with propensity score matching. It is found that that the impact on overall 
employment is very small and not statistically significant. However, the minimum wage 
increase has a negative and statistically significant effect on employment in the formal 
sectors. Workers with low wage can lose the job in the formal sector because of the 
minimum wage increase.  
There are several policy implications resulting from this study’s findings. Firstly, 
there are still a relatively large proportion of workers in the formal sector who are paid 
below the minimum wage. These workers might not have labor contract or be registered 
to Vietnam Social Securities. If the minimum wages are not effective for low-income 
workers, increasing minimum wages will mainly benefit workers who are working in the 
 24
State sector with labor contracts and being paid high wages (tied to the minimum wage 
level). The government should have more measures and regulations to enforce the labor 
law and the minimum wages so that not only enterprises but also individuals and 
households are not allowed to pay their employers below the minimum wages. Secondly, 
although increased minimum wages did not increase unemployment as a whole, it is 
found that workers below the minimum wages lost formal sector jobs. Thus attention 
should be paid to low-wage workers in the formal workers to protect them from 
minimum-wage. Thirdly, although the informal sector will be shrunk because of 
economic transition, it can still play a role in mitigating the adverse effect of economic 
shocks. When there is an employment shock, people who lost employment in the formal 
sector can find work in the informal sector, at least in the short-run.         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 25
References 
 
Abadie, A. and Guido. W. Imbens (2006). ‘On the failure of the bootstrap for matching 
estimators’, NBER Technical Working Paper No. 325, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau 
of Economic Research.  
Abowd, J. M., Francis K., and David N. M. (1999). ‘Minimum wages and employment in 
France and the United States’. NBER Technical Working Paper No. 6996, Cambridge, 
MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.  
Bao Moi. 2009. ‘Tăng lương tối thiểu nên mừng hay lo?’, Báo Mới (New Newspaper), 
dated on 8/4/2009. Available at http://www.baomoi.com/Tang-luong-toi-thieu-nen-mung-
hay-lo/47/2615949.epi  
Bazen, S. (2000). ‘The impact of the regulation of low wages on inequality and labour 
market adjustment: a comparative analysis’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 16(1), 
pp. 57-69. 
Bell, L. (1997). ‘The impact of minimum wages in Mexico and Colombia’, Journal of 
Labor Economics, 15(3), pp. 102-135. 
Brown, C., Gilroy C., and Kohen A. (1982). ‘The effect of the minimum wage on 
employment and unemployment’, Journal of Economic Literature, 20, pp. 487-528 
Brown, C. (1999). ‘Minimum wages, employment and the distribution of income’, In 
Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3. Edited by O. Ashenfelter and D. Card. Elsevier 
Science, 1999, pp. 2101-2163. 
Burkhauser, R. V., Couch K. A. and Wittenburg D. C. (2000). ‘A reassessment of the 
new economics of the minimum wage literature with monthly data from the current 
population survey’, Journal of Labor Economics, 18(4), pp. 653-680. 
Campolieti, M., Fang T. and Gunderson M. (2005). ‘Minimum wage impacts on youth 
employment transitions, 1993-1999’, Canadian Journal of Economics, 18(1), pp. 81-104. 
Card, D. and Krueger A. (1994). ‘Minimum wages and employment: a case study of the 
fast- food industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania’, American Economic Review, 84(5), 
pp. 772-93. 
 26
Card, D. and Krueger A. (1995). Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the 
Minimum Wage. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. 
Card, D. and Krueger A. (2000). ‘Minimum wages and employment: a case study of the 
fast-food industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania: Reply.’ American Economic Review, 
90(5), pp. 1397-1420. 
Card, D. (1992). ‘Do minimum wages reduce employment? a case study of California, 
1987- 1989’, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 46(1), pp. 38-54. 
Cochran, W. G. (1968). ‘The effectiveness of adjustment by subclassification in 
removing bias in observational studies’, Biometrics, 24, pp. 295-313. 
Cochran, W. G. and Chambers S. P. (1965). ‘The planning of observational studies of 
human population’, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 128(2), pp. 234-266. 
Dan Tri. 2009a. ‘Tăng lương sẽ không tác động nhiều đến tăng giá’, Báo Dân Trí (People 
Intellectual Newspapers), dated 8/4/2009 
Dan Tri. 2009b. ‘Mừng ít, lo nhiều chuyện tăng lương’, Báo Dân Trí (People Intellectual 
Newspapers), dated on 8/4/2009. 
Deaton, A. (1997). The Analysis of Household Surveys. The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A. 
Dehejia, R. and S. Wahba. (1998). ‘Propensity score matching methods for non-
experimental causal studies’, NBER Technical Working Paper No. 6829, Cambridge, 
MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.  
Dickens, R., Machin S., Manning A., Metcalf D., Wadsworth,  and Woodland S. (1995). 
‘The effect of minimum wages on UK agriculture’, Journal of Agricultural Economics 
46(1), pp. 1–19.  
Dickens, R., Machin S., and Manning A. (1999). ‘The effects of minimum wages on 
employment: theory and evidence from Britain’, Journal of Labor Economics, 17(1), pp. 
1–22.  
Dowrick, S. and Quiggin J. (2003). ‘A survey of the literature on minimum wage’, 
Unpublished Manuscript, Australian National University. 
 27
Duy-Tuan (2009). ‘Bộ trưởng LĐTB&XH: Nghe thì cứ tưởng là tăng lương...’, VTC 
News, dated on 8/4/2009. 
Gindling, T. and Terrell K. (2004). ‘The effects of multiple minimum wages throughout 
the labor market’, Discussion Paper No. 1159, Institute for the Study of Labor, Germany. 
Government of Vietnam. (2006). ‘Government decree on minimum wage’, No. 
94/2006/NĐ-CP, dated on September 7, 2006.    
Government of Vietnam. (2008). ‘Government decree on regional minimum wage for 
labor in enterprises, collective, farm, households and other organizations in Vietnam, No. 
110/2008/ND-CP dated on October 10, 2008’.    
Government of Vietnam. (2009). ‘Government decree on minimum wage’, No. 
33/2009/NĐ-CP, dated on April 6, 2009.    
Gunderson, M. (2005). ‘Minimum wages in Canada: theory, evidence and policy’, the 
Federal Labour Standards Review Commission, Minimum Wage No. 512.  
Hahn, J., Todd P. and van der Klaauw W. (2001). ‘Identification and estimation of 
treatment effects with a regression-discontinuity design.’ Econometrica, 69(1), pp. 201-
09. 
Harrison, A. and Scorse J. (2005). ‘Moving up or moving out? anti-sweatshop activists 
and labor market outcomes.’ NBER Technical Working Paper No. 10492, Cambridge, 
MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.   
Heckman, J., Ichimura H., and Todd P. (1997). ‘Matching as an econometric evaluation 
estimators: evidence from evaluating a job training programme’, Review of Economic 
Studies, 64(4), pp. 605- 654.  
Heckman, J., Lalonde R., and Smith J. (1999). ‘The economics and econometrics of 
active labor market programs’, Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3, Ashenfelter, 
A. and D. Card, eds., Amsterdam: Elsevier Science. 
Katz, L. F., and Krueger A. B. (1992). ‘The effect of the minimum wage on the fast food 
industry’, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 46(1), pp. 6-21. 
Lemos, S. (2004). ‘Minimum wage policy and employment effects: evidence from 
Brazil’, Economia, 5(1), pp. 219-66. 
 28
Mangan, J., and Johnston J. (1999). ‘Minimum wages, training wages and youth 
employment’, International Journal of Social Economics, 26(1), pp. 415-429. 
Montenegro, C.E., and Pagés C.  (2004). ‘Who benefits from labor market regulations? 
Chile, 1960-1998. In James Heckman and Carmen Pagés, eds., Law and Employment: 
Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean, pp. 401-34. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Neumark, D. and Wascher W. L. (2003). ‘Minimum wages and skill acquisition: another 
look at schooling effects’, Economics of Education Review, 22(1), pp. 1-10.  
Neumark, D. and Wascher W. L. (1992). ‘employment effects of minimum and 
subminimum wages: panel data on state minimum wage laws’, Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, 46(1), pp. 55-81. 
Neumark, D. and Wascher W. L. (1994). ‘Employment effects of minimum and 
subminimum wages: reply to Card, Katz, and Krueger’, Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, 47(3), pp. 497-512. 
Neumark, D. and Wascher W. L. (1995). ‘Minimum wage effects on school and work 
transitions of teenagers’, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 85(2), pp. 
244-49. 
Neumark, D. and Wascher W. L. (2000). ‘The effect of New Jersey’s minimum wage 
increase on fast-food employment: a reevaluation using payroll records’, American 
Economic Review, 90(5), pp. 1362-96. 
Neumark, D. and Wascher W. L. (2002). ‘State-level estimates of minimum wage effects: 
new evidence and interpretations from disequilibrium models’, Journal of Human 
Resources, 37(1), pp. 35-62. 
Neumark, D. and Wascher W. L. (2007). ‘Minimum wages and employment’, IZA DP 
No. 2570, Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn, German. 
Rama, M. (2001). ‘The consequences of doubling the minimum wage: the case of 
Indonesia’, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 54(4), pp. 864-81. 
Reich, M. and Hall P. (2001). ‘A small raise for the bottom: the impact of the 1996 1998 
California minimum wage increases.’ In James Lincoln and Paul Ong, eds., The State of 
 29
California Labor, 2001, pp. 123-48. University of California Institute for Labor and 
Employment.  
Freeman, R. B. (1994). ‘Minimum wages – again!’, International Journal of Manpower, 
15(2), pp. 8-25.  
Rosenbaum, P. R., and Rubin. R. (1983). ‘The central role of the propensity score in 
observational studies for causal effects’, Biometrika, 70(1), pp. 41-55. 
Rubin, D. B. (1977). ‘Assignment to a treatment group on the basis of a covariate’, 
Journal of Educational Statistics, 2(1), pp. 1-26.   
Singell, L. D., and Terborg J. R. (2006). ‘Employment effects of two Northwest 
minimum wage initiatives’, Economic Inquiry, 45(1), pp. 40-55. 
Smith, J. and Todd P. (2005). ‘Does matching overcome LaLonde’s critique of 
nonexperimental estimators?’, Journal of Econometrics, 125 (1–2), pp. 305–353. 
Thai-Uyen. 2009. ‘Tăng lương tối thiểu, lương hưu’, Báo Thanh Niên (Youth 
Newspapers), dated on 06/04/2009  
Van der Klaauw, W. (2002). ‘Estimating the effect of financial aid offers on college 
enrollment: a regression-discontinuity approach’, International Economic Review, 43(4), 
pp. 1249-87. 
Vu-Thieu (2006). ‘Minimum wage in the world and lesson learned for Vietnam’, Report 
prepared for Ministry of Labor, Invalid and Social Affairs, Vietnam.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30
 
Appendix 1: Tables and Figures 
 
Table A.1. Mean and standard deviation of variables in the 2004 VHLSS 
 
Variables Type The sample of workers 
in formal sector who 
had monthly wages in 
2004 below 650,000 
VND 
The sample of workers 
in formal and informal 
sectors  who had wages 
monthly in 2004 below 
350,000 VND 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Married (yes = 1) Binary 0.629 0.483 0.470 0.501 
Age  Discrete 32.7 11.2 30.7 13.1 
The square of age Discrete 1194.5 795.4 1112.0 914.9 
Sex (male = 1, female =0) Binary 0.578 0.494 0.498 0.502 
Educational degree (yes = 1)      
Less than secondary education  Binary 0.269 0.444 0.495 0.502 
With secondary degree Binary 0.432 0.496 0.340 0.475 
With technical degree  or post-
secondary Binary 0.299 0.458 0.165 0.373 
Main occupation (yes = 1)    
  
Agriculture/forestry/fishery Binary 0.063 0.243 0.174 0.381 
Unskilled workers Binary 0.253 0.435 0.398 0.491 
Household variables      
Ethnic minorities (yes = 1) Binary 0.088 0.283 0.105 0.307 
Area of annual crop land per capita 
(1000 m2) Continuous 0.532 0.978 0.307 0.508 
Aquaculture surface per capita 
(1000 m2) Continuous 0.026 0.253 0.016 0.161 
Regional dummy variables      
Red River Delta Binary 0.248 0.433 0.302 0.461 
North East Binary 0.177 0.382 0.069 0.255 
North West  Binary 0.029 0.167 0.022 0.149 
North Central Coast  Binary 0.100 0.300 0.102 0.304 
South Central Coast  Binary 0.130 0.337 0.053 0.224 
Central Highlands Binary 0.033 0.178 0.042 0.202 
South East Binary 0.122 0.328 0.085 0.280 
Mekong River Delta Binary 0.161 0.368 0.324 0.470 
Urban areas (yes = 1) Binary 0.316 0.465 0.306 0.462 
Number of observations   463  163 
Note: The first sample used to compute estimates in this table includes laborers in the formal sector with age from 
15 to 60 and monthly wages in 2004 below 650 thousand VND. The second sample includes laborers in the formal 
and informal sectors with age from 15 to 60 and monthly wages in 2004 below 350 thousand VND. 
Mean and standard deviation are also corrected for sampling weights.  
Source: Estimation from panel data of VHLSSs 2004 and 2006. 
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Table A.2. Logit regression of propensity score 
Explanatory variables 
The sample of workers in 
formal sector who had 
monthly wages in 2004 
below 650,000 VND 
The sample of workers in 
formal and informal sectors  
who had monthly wages in 
2004 below 350,000 VND 
Full model Model with 
significant 
variables 
Full model Model with 
significant 
variables 
Married 0.1966  1.5028* 1.2752** 
 
[0.3257]  [0.8479] [0.5118] 
Age  -0.1489* -0.1144* -0.05  
 
[0.0773] [0.0691] [0.1530]  
The square of age 0.0021** 0.0017* 0.0008  
 
[0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0020]  
sex (male = 1, female =0) -0.5442** -0.5112** 0.1488  
 
[0.2589] [0.2534] [0.5360]  
Lower or upper secondary 0.3212  1.4036** 1.0394* 
 
[0.3169]  [0.5929] [0.5755] 
Technical degree or post secondary -0.0909  2.2060** 1.5653** 
 
[0.3571]  [0.9748] [0.6652] 
Agriculture/forestry/fishery -0.278  -4.6483*** -3.5864*** 
 
[0.6532]  [1.1001] [0.8426] 
Unskilled workers -0.3458  -1.6943*** -1.6630*** 
 
[0.3146]  [0.6373] [0.5785] 
Ethnic minorities (yes = 1) 1.9255*** 1.7718*** 1.0833  
 
[0.4700] [0.4335] [1.0788]  
Area of annual crop land per capita (1000 m2) -0.4069* -0.4055** 0.0641  
 
[0.2174] [0.1918] [0.7435]  
Aquaculture surface per capita (1000 m2) 0.1741    
 
[0.4145]    
Red River Delta Omitted    
 
    
North East -0.652 -0.6020* 1.5951  
 
[0.4064] [0.3586] [1.0363]  
North West -0.4134  -1.5256  
 
[0.8444]  [1.5186]  
North Central Coast 0.2509  2.2944** 1.5629* 
 
[0.3922]  [0.9814] [0.9104] 
South Central Coast -0.7200* -0.7487** 0.7864  
 
[0.4140] [0.3761] [1.3364]  
Central Highlands -1.2979 -1.3914* -1.499  
 
[0.8739] [0.7903] [1.1486]  
South East -1.0070** -1.0144** 1.9496  
 
[0.5081] [0.4522] [1.2361]  
Mekong River Delta -0.3851  0.3309  
 
[0.3931]  [0.6655]  
Urban areas (yes = 1) 0.0283  -0.9099  
 
[0.2852]  [0.6141]  
Constant 1.7397 1.1782 -1.0037 -1.0108* 
 32
Explanatory variables 
The sample of workers in 
formal sector who had 
monthly wages in 2004 
below 650,000 VND 
The sample of workers in 
formal and informal sectors  
who had monthly wages in 
2004 below 350,000 VND 
Full model Model with 
significant 
variables 
Full model Model with 
significant 
variables 
 
[1.2852] [1.1093] [2.5626] [0.6053] 
Observations 463 463 163 163 
R-squared 0.08 0.06 0.42 0.36 
Note: In the sample of workers in the formal sector who have monthly wages in 2004 between 0 and 
650,000 VND, the treatment group includes workers having monthly wages below 350,000 VND, and the 
control group includes workers having wages equal to or above 350,000 VND. Thus the dependent 
variable is a dummy variable indicating ‘monthly wage below 350,000VND’. 
In the sample of workers in workers in both the formal and informal sectors, the treatment group includes 
informal workers having monthly wages below 350,000 VND, and the control group includes informal 
workers having monthly wages below 350,000 VND. Thus the dependent variable is a dummy variable 
indicating ‘workers in the formal sector’. 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are also corrected for sampling weights and cluster correlation.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Estimation from panel data of VHLSSs 2004 and 2006. 
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Table A.3. Difference-in-differences regressions: marginal effects 
Explanatory variables 
Sample of workers in the formal 
sector with monthly wage below 
650,000 VND 
Sample of workers in the formal 
sector with monthly wage from 
350,000 to 1,000,000 VND 
Dependent 
variables is 
‘employed’ 
 
Dependent 
variables is 
‘employed in 
formal sector’ 
Dependent 
variables is 
‘employed’ 
 
Dependent 
variables is 
‘employed in 
formal sector’ 
     
Below minimum wages (yes = 1) * Year 2006  0.00011 -0.11992*   
 [0.00075] [0.06764]   
Married 0.00759 0.09154 0.03323 -0.02394 
 [0.01124] [0.06271] [0.02343] [0.05123] 
Age  0.00055 0.02435 0.00761** 0.03367** 
 [0.00067] [0.01494] [0.00384] [0.01357] 
The square of age -0.00001 -0.00040** -0.00011** -0.00047** 
 [0.00001] [0.00020] [0.00005] [0.00018] 
Sex (male = 1, female =0) 0.00003 -0.05118 0.00783 -0.06830* 
 [0.00063] [0.05080] [0.00861] [0.03796] 
Lower or upper secondary -0.00255 0.12148* -0.01076 0.09031* 
 [0.00304] [0.06349] [0.01190] [0.05026] 
Technical degree or post secondary -0.00283 0.20678*** -0.01608 0.19837*** 
 [0.00477] [0.06350] [0.01839] [0.05326] 
Agriculture/forestry/fishery -0.00113 -0.11741 -0.01651 -0.06492 
 [0.00379] [0.11797] [0.03440] [0.09574] 
Unskilled workers -0.00720 -0.16804*** -0.02845 -0.12188** 
 [0.00913] [0.06166] [0.02227] [0.05578] 
Ethnic minorities (yes = 1)  0.13180  0.05125 
  [0.09363]  [0.08395] 
Area of annual crop land per capita (1000 m2) 0.00601 0.03550 0.02779** 0.01958 
 [0.00715] [0.02663] [0.01220] [0.02033] 
Aquaculture surface per capita (1000 m2)  -0.55322***  -0.08989 
  [0.21325]  [0.05727] 
Red River Delta Omitted  Omitted  
     
North East -0.00047 -0.01488 0.01033 0.06470 
 [0.00180] [0.07123] [0.00853] [0.05940] 
North West  -0.16179  0.02575 
  [0.17774]  [0.14194] 
North Central Coast -0.00103 -0.00365 0.00817 0.01562 
 [0.00228] [0.09499] [0.00893] [0.07668] 
South Central Coast 0.00029 0.04525 0.01354 0.06123 
 [0.00088] [0.08601] [0.00854] [0.06850] 
Central Highlands -0.13933 -0.12995 -0.08938 -0.05403 
 [0.18670] [0.20826] [0.11636] [0.14621] 
South East 0.00052 0.03312 -0.00818 -0.03264 
 [0.00078] [0.08677] [0.01703] [0.07176] 
Mekong River Delta 0.00080 0.08461 0.00755 0.03829 
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Explanatory variables 
Sample of workers in the formal 
sector with monthly wage below 
650,000 VND 
Sample of workers in the formal 
sector with monthly wage from 
350,000 to 1,000,000 VND 
Dependent 
variables is 
‘employed’ 
 
Dependent 
variables is 
‘employed in 
formal sector’ 
Dependent 
variables is 
‘employed’ 
 
Dependent 
variables is 
‘employed in 
formal sector’ 
 [0.00112] [0.06734] [0.00883] [0.06219] 
Urban areas (yes = 1) 0.00053 0.08105 0.00616 0.08505* 
 [0.00082] [0.04965] [0.00826] [0.04378] 
Log of wages in 2004 (thousand VND)   -0.01500 0.05331 
   [0.01919] [0.07662] 
Observations 463 463 643 643 
R-squared 0.438 0.090 0.246 0.087 
Note: This table presents the difference-in-differences regression. The standard difference-in-difference regressions is: 
εβββββ +++++= 43210 XDTTDY , 
where Y is outcome (employment, wage and expenditure in this case), T is a year dummy, with a one for 2006 and zero 
for 2004, D is dummy variable indicating monthly wage below 350,000 VND (or wages below 650,000 VND in the 
second sample) , X is the vector of control variables. The difference-in-difference estimator is the coefficient of 
interaction between T and D, i.e., 1β . When the dependent variable is employment which is dummy, a probit model is 
used. However, since the probit model is non-linear, the variables TD and T in difference-in-differences are dropped. In 
addition, we report the marginal effects of explanatory variables in this table, since the original coefficients in the probit 
model do not have clear economic meaning. 
There are two samples in this table. The first sample includes laborers in the formal sector in 2004 with age from 15 to 
60 and monthly wages below 650,000 VND. The treatment group is workers with monthly wages below 350,000 VND. 
The second sample includes laborers in the formal sector in 2004 with age from 15 to 60 and monthly wage between 
350,000 VND and 1,000,000 VND. The treatment group is workers who had monthly wage in 2004 below 650,000 
VND, and the control are those having monthly wage in 2004 equal to or above 650,000 VND. 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are also corrected for sampling weights and cluster correlation. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Estimation from panel data of VHLSSs 2004 and 2006. 
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Figure A.1. Propensity score of the treatment and control groups 
The sample of workers in the formal sector who had 
wages in 2004 between 0 and 650,000 VND) 
The sample of workers in the formal and informal 
sectors  who had wages in 2004 between 0 and 
350,000 VND 
Note: In the sample of workers in the formal sector who have monthly wages in 2004 between 0 and 
650,000 VND, the treatment group includes workers having monthly wages below 350,000 VND, and the 
control group includes workers having wages equal to or above 350,000 VND. In the sample of workers in 
workers in both the formal and informal sectors, the treatment group includes informal workers having 
monthly wages below 350,000 VND, and the control group includes informal workers having monthly 
wages below 350,000 VND. 
Source: Estimation from panel data of VHLSSs 2004 and 2006. 
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Appendix 2: Propensity score matching estimators 
 
The control group is constructed by matching each participant i (workers exposed to the 
minimum wage increase) in the treatment group with one or more non-participants 
(workers not exposed to the minimum wage increase) j whose propensity scores are 
closest to the propensity score of the participant i. For a participant i, denote nic as the 
number of non-participants j who are matched with this participant, and w(i,j) the weight 
attached to the outcome of each non-participant. These weights are defined non-negative 
and sum up to 1, i.e.: 
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where np is the number of the participants in the data sample. 20061iY  and 20060 jY are the 
observed outcomes of participant i and matched non-participant j in 2006 (after the 
minimum wage increase in 2005), respectively. 20040iY  and 20040 jY  are the observed 
outcomes of participant i and non-participant j in 2004 (before the minimum wage 
increase in 2005), respectively. (A.2) can be written as follows: 
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The terms in equation (A.3) correspond with the means of treated and matched controls in 
2004 and 2006 in Table 4.  
If each participant is matched with the one non-participant with the minimum 
value of d(i,j) (where d(i,j) is the distance between the propensity scores of participant i 
and that of non-participant j), the weight w(i,j) equals 1 for all pairs of matches. This is 
called one nearest neighbor matching. When more than one non-participants are matched 
with each participant (or vice versa), we need some ways to define the weights attached 
to each non-participant.  
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A number of methods use equal weights for all matches. N-nearest neighbors 
matching involves matching each participant with n non-participants whose have the 
closest propensity scores. Each matched non-participant will receive weight njiw /1),( = . 
However, it could be reasonable to assign different weights to different non-participants 
depending on metric distances between their covariates and the covariates of the matched 
participant (see, e.g., Heckman, et al., 1997; Smith and Todd, 2005). The kernel matching 
method matches a participant with one or many non-participants depending on a kernel 
function G and a selected bandwidth h. In this paper, we used an Epanechnikov kernel 
with bandwidth of 0.05.  
 
 
 
 
